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R E S E A R C H E S S A Y
T O B I A S R E T T I G
From Subaltern to Free Worker: Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty among Indochina’s Subaltern
Imperial Labor Camp Diaspora in
Metropolitan France, –
The twentieth century has seen its share of Vietnamese diasporas andmigratory flows. In France alone, one counts six different Vietnamese
diasporas, each unique in its composition, motivation, politics, and length of
stay in France.1 As in the First World War, the Vietnamese Second World
War diaspora was unique in that its migration was meant to be temporary (for
the duration of the war only), organized by the French imperial nation-state
that largely requisitioned rather than attracted labor, and in that the migrants
were exclusively male. The French journalist Pierre Daum has called them
forced laborers, whereas the French-Vietnamese scholar Liêm-Khê Luguern
refers to them as “requisitioned workers” or “soldier workers” [lính thợ].2
How did these roughly nineteen thousand workers get to France? Why did
the great majority stay on far longer than their contracts stipulated? What
were their reactions towards their situation? The first part of this essay exam-
ines the individual and collective Vietnamese responses towards the French
imperial nation-state’s call in late  for Indochinese to work in France’s
defense industries.3 It covers their requisition and recruitment, their rapid
shipment to and arrival in France, and the period up to the metropole’s
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unexpectedly swift defeat by Germany on June , . In this first section,
I distinguish primarily between two groups, namely the unskilled workers
[ouvriers non–spécalisés (ONS)] and the interpreters and supervisors [surveil-
lants]. Many of the ONS were poor, often illiterate, and for the most part,
requisitioned. In contrast, the supervisors and in particular the interpreters
generally came from better-off social and educational backgrounds; some-
times they were even the sons of notables and administrators. They often
volunteered to serve in an intermediary role between the French administra-
tion and the ONS.
The next part deals with the workers’ and translators’ attempts to cope, and
sometimes to profit, from the militarized labor regime and camp system they
found themselves in. How did they react to the deteriorating working and liv-
ing conditions during the period from the establishment of the fascist Vichy
government to the liberation of France in ? For the most part of these in-
creasingly difficult three years, there was very little opportunity to escape the
confines of the camps and very little scope to openly and collectively contest
the administrative grip of the Agency for Indigenous, North African and
Colonial Manpower [Service de Main–d’œuvre Indigène, Nord-Africaine et
Coloniale] (hereafter MOI), which was in charge of the Indochinese workers.
It was only when the tides of war changed in  that the workers slowly
began to assert themselves against a system that exploited them as unfree
laborers and as colonial subjects. Finally, this essay covers the  period dur-
ing which many of the Vietnamese workers became radicalized and not only
gained significant autonomy in terms of self-organization and the right to
link up with French unions, but also access to the French labor market and
professional training. In addition, they demanded the establishment of an
electoral democracy in Vietnam at a time when French Indochina was still
under Vichy rule.4
In each of the three sections, I draw upon Albert O. Hirschman’s concepts
of “exit, voice, and loyalty” to better understand “responses to decline in firms,
organizations and states.”According to Hirschman, when members or clients
of any human grouping perceive that it is declining in quality or benefit to its
members, they can respond in two ways: withdraw from the relationship and
leave the firm, organization, or state; or voice grievances and proposals for
change in an attempt to repair or improve the relationship. Additionally,
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Hirschman posited that loyalty can affect the cost-benefit analysis of whether
to use exit or voice, and to what degrees. The conceptual triangulation of “exit,
voice and loyalty,” but also the responses and sometimes even preemptive
measures of human groups to these signs of decline, provides important per-
spective on social action as well as on the relationship between economic and
political action.5
Hirschman’s template is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide variety
of situations and responses. For most of the – period, the ONS found
themselves in the polar opposite of a free market situation in which exit would
usually be an easy strategy and firms would actually have a strong incentive to
listen to voice. Instead, the Vietnamese workers were the subjects of a mono-
polistic and dominant “imperial nation-state” that was highly bureaucratic
and strongly infused with racial hierarchies. It used the MOI as an organiza-
tion to assign workers to defense-related tasks, later lease them to the private
sector below French market rates, and prevent them until at least  from
entering the French “free” labor market. Throughout this period, the MOI
largely affected and controlled their everyday lives.6 Hirschman’s concept
of “exit, voice, and loyalty” is sufficiently stringent to cover the various
options open to the Indochinese, particularly why the unskilled workers and
the interpreters and supervisors often chose different strategies. Finally, this
concept can account for how complex and dynamic changes, such as those in
the political and military arena, strongly influenced the workers’ and inter-
preters’ changing preferences for exit, voice, and loyalty during the –
period.7
This essay aims to better understand a little known—at least outside of
France—Vietnamese diaspora with unusual characteristics and an original
history by using a new conceptual approach. More generally, it also intends to
add to our knowledge of a relative blank spot in Vietnamese history, namely
the – period. Many histories of French-Indochinese institutions, such
as the military or penal system, end in  or , because of the historical
and archival ruptures brought about by the Second World War.8 The few po-
litical histories that cover the war period tend to focus on French Indochina
rather than the Vietnamese in France, and even less so on those “parked” in
the camps.9 The same also holds true for sociohistorical studies of particular
organizations such as youth groups.10
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This essay draws on primary sources such as the memoirs of Monsieur
Lê Hữu Tho; secondary sources such as the oral history accounts collected
in France and Vietnam by the French journalist Pierre Daum and the
French-Vietnamese academic Liêm-Khê Luguern; the very comprehensive
website put together by one of the descendants of these workers, Monsieur
Joël Pham; and a video documentary by Dzu Le Lieu, among others.11
Further, it is motivated by two interviews conducted in  of two former
“workers” of different social and educational backgrounds: Lê Hữu Tho, the
adventurous son of a mandarin, who opted for integration into French so-
ciety and social advancement, and Đặng Văn Long, who became a leading
Trotskyist activist who also remained in France and integrated into French
society.
The Indochinese Origins of a Vietnamese
Labor Camp Diaspora
V O L U N T A R Y O R F O R C E D M O B I L I Z A T I O N F O R T H E S E C O N D
W O R L D W A R : S O C I O - E D U C A T I O N A L A N D
R E G I O N A L D I F F E R E N C E S
The French experience of the First World War, when , Indochinese sol-
diers and ,workers were sent to France and its Mediterranean theatres of
war, provided the historical backdrop for the renewed transfer of Indochinese
manpower to France.12 It had demonstrated that French Indochina possessed
a previously unexploited pool of manpower that could be put to the use of the
metropole. It had shown furthermore that French Indochina, particularly its
Vietnamese constituents of Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin, was part of a
wider French imperial system of manpower. As a result, French policymakers
would be tempted to draw again on their overseas manpower reserves in times
of military threats to the “motherland” [mère-patrie].
With regard to the future metropolitan colonial labor, a first interministe-
rial “instruction” in  affirmed that France’s overseas labor pool would be
tapped into again in times of conflict.13 These plans became more concrete in
 when a second interministerial instruction envisaged setting up, in time
of war, an Agency for Indigenous, North African and Colonial Manpower.14
The MOI, as it would later be abbreviated, was to be under the Ministry of
Labor, and was considered best placed to identify the French imperial
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nation-state’s labor needs for the war industry. Yet actual recruitment—and
if need be, requisition—was delegated to the respective governors who were
under the Ministry of Colonies.15
When the specter of war in the Asia-Pacific and in Europe cast a threaten-
ing shadow on France’s “balcony onto the Pacific,” the new leftwing Daladier
government launched a thirty-three million piaster loan in May  to fi-
nance French Indochina’s defense preparations and decreed the recruitment
of an additional twenty thousand Indochinese troops.16 One year later, on
May , , Édouard Daladier decreed the overseas extension of the French
law of July ,  that provided the framework for France’s war prepara-
tions.17 It allowed France to requisition colonial subjects if not enough of
themwere voluntarily attracted by a remuneration based on criteria in the col-
ony or protectorate. The decree also stipulated that this contract could not be
extended beyond the duration of the war.
A first requisitioning drive led to the selection of slightly more than
nineteen thousand Indochinese for overseas work in their “mère-patrie.”18
As during the First World War, the bulk of the Indochinese labor force to be
sent to France came from the “Vietnamese” protectorates, as Annam provided
more than half (, or . percent) and Tonkin more than a third (,
or . percent) of the roughly , men.19 Less than a tenth (,, or
. percent) of the workers were from the French colony of Cochinchina. In
contrast, the protected kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos do not appear to
have contributed any labor power at all.20 As a result, most of the ,
“Indochinese” workers actually were ethnically Vietnamese. It is very likely
that far more workers and soldiers would have been mobilized if not for
France’s unexpectedly swift defeat by Germany, which cut short plans to
mobilize considerably more Indochinese for overseas service.21
Once requisitioned or volunteered, the men were gathered in provincial
centers, “where they were matriculated, shorn, vaccinated and received a pro-
visional uniform,” as well as some basic military training and exposure to can-
tonment work.22 This was to be their first experience with the “camp” and
military-like discipline. Should they have thought of running away at this
stage, their shaved heads served as reminders of how easily they would be
identified by the authorities.23 It appears that companies made up of about
two hundred fifty men and roughly half a dozen interpreters each were
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already formed at this stage, meaning that the men of a company gener-
ally came from the same province.24 From the provincial centers, the
workers were then directed to the ports of embarkment, namely Hải
Phòng in Tonkin, Tourane (present-day Đà Nẵng) in Annam, and Sài
Gòn in Cochinchina. Organized into companies, they would embark for
France between October ,  and May , , with the first ship
arriving in France on November ,  and the fifteenth and final one
on June , .25
The farewells were often painful and, in many cases, forever. Lê Hữu Tho
recalls the embrace of his mother and how tears streamed down her face.26
He embarked on February ,  on board the d’Entrecasteaux of the
Messageries Maritimes Françaises shipping lines from Tourane with the
th Company.27 The mood was somber as the men boarded the ship, “tears
in their eyes,” “anxiously awaiting departure,” “prostrated like convicts,”while
“fathers, mothers, women, children,” but also “fiancées [and] friends” assem-
bled on the quayside and “cried or sighed” or “sobbed.”28
C O N S C R I P T I O N D O M I N A N T A M O N G T H E O N S ; V O L U N T E E R I S M
D O M I N A N T A M O N G I N T E R P R E T E R S A N D S U P E R V I S O R S
How many of the largely illiterate and unskilled workers had volunteered to
form a temporary overseas workforce, and how many had been requisi-
tioned? In Cochinchina, France’s only colony in Indochina, there was signifi-
cant popular resistance at the individual and to some extent the collective level
to the French call for overseas military and labor service, as well as to military
service within Indochina.29 This included disturbances at recruitment centers
where lots were drawn to decide who was to be conscripted, cases of self-
mutilation to escapemilitary service, and prosecutions for incitement to refuse
enlistment.30 At the end of , the Governor of Cochinchina reported
“abstentions at the special drawing of lots for workers.”31 Moreover, “[i]n
some regions the atmosphere is troublesome and incidents break out in front
of regroupment camps.”32 This would partially explain Cochinchina’s modest
contribution to France’s war effort, and it is quite conceivable that the propor-
tion of volunteers among the one thousand eight hundred Cochinchinese was
higher than among the workers from Annam and Tonkin, although we lack
further data to prove this conclusively.
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Cochinchina’s contribution was in marked contrast to the disproportion-
ately higher number of young men from the protectorates of Tonkin and in
particular Annam. These jurisdictions were generally more densely populated
and with fewer economic opportunities due to a weaker labor market. More-
over, the villages were more adept at implementing the colonial administra-
tion’s request for men, through a quota rather than lottery system, which
was passed down from the Resident Superior to the provinces and then fur-
ther down. Village heads had to strictly implement orders to provide a certain
number of young men. To prevent resistance, an individual who tried to es-
cape service would be severely punished and his entire village collectively held
responsible and punished also.33
There was considerable leeway, however, with regard to who was selected if
there was a lack of volunteers. As a result, many village heads targeted the
socially disadvantaged and families with several sons. For example, in late
August , the servant of the village head of Tử Đà Village (Phù Ninh
District, Phú Thọ Province, Tonkin) threatened the brother of one Thiều Văn
Mưu (born May , ), saying that: “You have two boys in your family. One
of you is obliged to join the O.N.S., otherwise your father will be impris-
oned.”34 Although both brothers had initially run away, Thiều Văn Mưu
eventually went instead of his brother, first as a worker, but was made super-
visor upon arrival in France.35 Overall, the vast majority of workers from
Tonkin and Annam were requisitioned due to a lack of volunteers, with one
important exception: there was considerable demand for positions requiring
some knowledge of the French language.36
Many Vietnamese with the ability to read, write, and speak French were
keen on enlisting as supervisors and preferably even as interpreters. A certifi-
cate of primary studies [certificat d’étude primaires] appears to have been suf-
ficient, as demonstrated by the case of Le Van Phu [sic] (born  near Vinh),
the son of a notable who could not afford to send his son to the lycée.37
He signed up as an interpreter with expectations of getting a better job upon
his return home. Among the most socially and educationally elevated among
this elite group of “workers” was the above-mentioned Lê Hữu Tho ( or
–), born in Vinh, the son of a mandarin, and graduate of the presti-
gious Lycée Khải Định in Huế.38 He enthusiastically volunteered in the re-
cruitment office of his home city to become an interpreter. His natural
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sense of adventure was perhaps further nurtured by one of his father’s men of
confidence, Corporal [Cai] Loan, who had served two three-year terms in
France, but it was also nourished by the letters of his brother-in-law at the
Institut Pasteur in Paris.39
How would the selection process and its outcome—a large group of illiter-
ate and unskilled workers who had mostly been requisitioned and a small
group of supervisors and interpreters many of whom had volunteered—
impact the propensity for exit, voice, or loyalty? The ONS, largely illiterate and
from a rural background, did not identify as “unskilled workers” and were cer-
tainly not politicized along class lines. While they may have had a sense of
“national” or at least “class” consciousness, they had no awareness of political
theories or knowledge of organized political agitation. As in traditional Viet-
namese society, they were likely to look up to the better-educated supervisors
and interpreters, who were mostly of higher social status, and moreover knew
French, for guidance. This situation of dependency might be even further pro-
nounced in a foreign environment in which they lacked the language skills to
survive and where they required the support of their Vietnamese superiors as
intermediaries with the French and French society. In fact, while they would
address the young Lê Hữu Tho as “master,” they would also call him affection-
ately, but slightly mockingly, the “Little Mandarin,” or “Câu Âm” [Cậu Â´m].”40
But even the better-educated supervisors and interpreters “completely lacked a
political culture.”41
The few educated “elite” within the Indochinese contingent to be sent
to France generally appear to have come from families that did not really
question French rule, and, in several cases, served in public positions under
direct or indirect French imperial rule. They would expect to be looked up to
by the unskilled workers, but in return, at least the honest ones among them,
would try to be fair “masters.” However, they would have little interest in
openly questioning their own subordinate position vis-à-vis the French, or to
speak up too vehemently on behalf of the ONS under their own charge.
Instead, their best interest (at least formally) was in a loyalty strategy in hopes
of being promoted within the hierarchy so as to increase their own status and
influence, as well as their income.42 Provided there were no radical changes in
their professional environment and the wider economic and political context,
these men had little incentive to engage in any kind of action that might make
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them lose their rank and the attached privileges and prestige. In the next sec-
tions, starting with the journey to France, we will see whether these hypothe-
ses regarding the ONS and the small group of literate and French-speaking
supervisors and interpreters would hold true, and under what conditions exit,
voice, and loyalty strategies would change.
Going to France: Few Desertions, Little Voice
The average journey to France, usually via Singapore, Colombo, Djibouti, and
the Suez Canal, lasted about forty days. The journey was a relatively comfort-
able one for Lê Hữu Tho because his father’s good relations with Comman-
dant Moguez in Vinh, who also happened to lead his shipment, ensured
special lodgings in the cargo vessel’s small library.43 In contrast, for the vast
majority of the Indochinese, it would be one of many other camp experiences,
although in this case a floating one. They had to descend into the cargo com-
partments that had been transformed into enormous dormitories with double
or even triple bed frames that offered very little personal physical space, to the
extent that one often could not even sit upright on one’s bed.44 Their journey
did not mirror that of writer Nhất Linh who a few years earlier had observed
that the racial hierarchies on board tended to disappear the closer the passen-
gers got to France.45 Instead, racial differences remained intact as the ONS
did not share the same social space with the other passengers that would have
allowed for a leveling of social relations. Thus, a Vietnamese volunteer for
overseas military service on board another vessel complained that the metro-
politan soldiers got nice accommodations on deck while the Indochinese were
put into the cargo compartment, which they had to share with cattle.46 While
the French got to eat cattle meat, the Indochinese only got the cattle intestines
and scraps. In addition to cramped conditions and even outright mistreatment,
including physical punishment, the journey was wrought with other dangers.47
The ONS’ reactions to their first experience not only away from their
home province but their homeland were varied. Few chose the exit strategy;
only twenty-nine desertions were noted.48 The feelings of sadness at having to
leave one’s family and home carried over onto the ship. Some experienced se-
vere depression and homesickness. Le Ba Dang [sic] (born ), for example,
was from a well-off peasant family and was gifted in the arts rather than
in school; at some point on the journey he contemplated suicide.49 Another,
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apparently even younger and more sensitive ONS took his own life on board
an earlier ship.50
On the journey to France, there are very few examples of voice on record.
An “inconsequential revolt” during the Entrecasteaux’s mooring in Sài Gòn
among the men of the th Company was reported to have been caused by
homesickness, “insufficient food and bad treatment at the hands of the escorts
and seamen.”51 It is not clear whether this report led to any improvements of
the conditions on board. Another incident occurred on board the Minh in
early  when a spontaneous and short hunger strike erupted among some
of the ONS.52 The strike exposed the delicate position interpreters could find
themselves in, as the French accused one of them, Hoàng Khoa Khôi (–
April , ), of being the strike leader even though he denied this.53 He was
punished with two days in a room earmarked for quarantining passengers
suspected of infectious diseases and then quickly released when the authorities
realized the potentially contagious nature of this solitary confinement.
Overall, there is little evidence that the Indochinese interpreters and super-
visors adopted voice or exit strategies. In fact, many had volunteered in order
to use their overseas experience for social progress, and an attitude that showed
loyalty made most sense for them. Even for those who had been requisitioned,
the benefits of their special status—higher salary, higher status, and not having
to engage in manual labor—were all too obvious when compared to the un-
skilled workers. Several of the interviewed interpreters stressed that they tried
to be fair to the French and to their own countrymen, but conceded that some
among them took advantage of their position.54 In fact, some ONS would later
accuse the interpreters of having profited from their position for personal
gains, even keeping to themselves and being bootlickers to the French.55
The French Making of a Vietnamese Labor Camp
Diaspora Stranded in France, –
Having been recruited or requisitioned for France’s defense for a length of ser-
vice that was not to exceed the war, the , Indochinese who disembarked
in Marseille had no inkling that they would remain stranded in France for
much longer than the short Franco-German war that lasted from of June 
to June , . The next five years were characterized by varying labor re-
gimes closely related to changes in political order and generally in-sync with
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international developments: the abrupt end of the Third French Republic, the
emergence of the German-backed Vichy government also known as the
État Français [French State], followed by the Allied Forces invasion and
the birth of the Fourth French Republic. During this period, one of the
few constants—and continuations from their conscription and transfer to
France—was that the life of most ONS revolved around surviving in labor
camps and labor companies modeled on military hierarchies. When, and
under what conditions, would exit (escape) or voice emerge?
A R R I V A L I N F R A N C E A N D F I R S T P L A C E S O F W O R K , :
F U L F I L L I N G T H E C O N T R A C T
Upon disembarking in Marseille, large flatbed trucks with tarpaulins carried
the ONS through a city so much bigger and more different than anything they
had ever seen before:
“Everything is different . . . We do not have any reference point any more [. . . .]
The people and the animals are different. The smells are indefinable.”56
Lê Hữu Tho notes that for most of the ONS, mostly peasants, the excess of
“asphalt and cement” prevented them from touching the earth that was so im-
portant to them, and that their lack of French-language skills led to an almost
frightening uprooting.57 The ONS were headed towards their first “camp” in
France, Les Baumettes, a gigantic new prison complex (then) to the south of
Marseilles that was in the final stages of construction, and unwittingly became
its first inhabitants.58 The Indochinese workers, organized into companies of
about two hundred fifty workers and about eight translators each, were then
directed to their new places of work that were generally tied to further camp
experiences.59
Most of the initial seventy-three companies headed towards ammunition
factories in southern, in particular southwestern, and central France. Nine com-
panies worked at Saint-Médard-en-Jalles (Gironde), eight companies each at
Bourges (Cher) and Angoulême (Poitou-Charente), seven at Bergerac, five at
Sorgues (Vaucluse), four each at Toulouse (Haute-Garonne) and Salbris
(Loir-et-Cher), and three at Saint-Chamas (Bouches-du-Rhône), adding up to
a total of forty-eight companies (see Figure ).60 The remaining companies were
spread more thinly across France.
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Lê Hữu Tho’s th Company was one of the few to be directed towards
northwestern France. Their destination was the Poudrerie Kuhlmann, a powder
and ammunition factory in Oissel (Seine Maritime) more than seven hundred
fifty kilometers from Marseille.61 Theirs was not the typical camp experience
because theywere quartered inOissel’s community center, a fifteen-minute walk
from the factory.62 Although the “food was good and abundant” and featured
daily provisions of meat, far more than a Vietnamese peasant would ever get at
home, they associated their work with “hell” and “would have preferred to enroll
F I G U R E 1: Changing territorial jurisdictions of Vichy France and locations of the
Indochinese workers. Based on a simplified version of an administrative map of
France during the Second World War. SOURCE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:
France_map_Lambert-_with_regions_and_departments-occupation.svg
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in a combat unit.”63 This was largely due to ruptures from their traditional
occupations in the Vietnamese countryside. They disliked being bound to the
stationarymonotony of Taylorist industrial production, had problems adjusting
to the eight-hour shift system (which involved night work), feared being blown
up in a German aerial attack, and suffered from the effects of the powder.64 The
corrosive powder pervaded everything. During toilet breaks, some powder re-
mained “at the tip of their fingers” even after they had taken off their gloves, thus
“caus[ing] terrible irritations on their genitals!”65 Moreover, breathing in some
of the powder was almost unavoidable. While direct contact with the poisonous
substance caused eczemas, inhalation caused “nausea, reduced the appetite,
[and] made [them] sleepless,” thus further exacerbating the effects of the night-
shift.66 Consequently, some workers had to be hospitalized.
Exit, Voice, and Fulfilling the Contract
During the relatively short time between arrival in France and the French
surrender, there is very little evidence of active exit or voice. Indeed, loyalty
seems to have been the best possible choice for the Vietnamese workers and
interpreters and supervisors. While some workers might have wished them-
selves back home or would have preferred to serve in combat units (Lê Hữu
Tho did, for example), these plans for exit remained wishful. The workers
were unfamiliar with their new environment, and the chances of a desertion
succeeding were too remote, not to mention the possible consequences in
times of war.
A strike nevertheless appears to have happened prior to the French
defeat when the th Company protested against its Corsican commander,
a former Indochina “hand” like many of the other French commanding
personnel, for having misappropriated part of the workers’ food and tob-
acco.67 Despite the police being sent in and the threat of a military tribunal,
the strike succeeded because the French workers in the ammunitions fac-
tory supported their Indochinese coworkers, with the eventual result that
“Monsieur R. and his agents were transferred elsewhere.”68 One can specul-
ate whether the state of war made it more likely that action would be taken
against proven fraudsters within the command so as to ensure discipline
and maintain loyalty. We will soon see that the dramatic end of the Third
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Republic and the ensuing four years would make it easy for people in
authority to take advantage of their situation.
F R A N C E ’ S D E F E A T A N D T H E E N D O F T H E T H I R D
F R E N C H R E P U B L I C
The workers had just acquainted themselves with their new places of work
and rest when Germany’s sudden “Blitzkrieg” invasion on June , , and
France’s unexpectedly swift defeat by June , , ground the usefulness of
Indochinese workers in the weapons industry to a sudden halt. As they all
feared the advancing German enemy, this considerably increased setting aside
loyalty in favor of exit and voice, not least because they all expected to be
repatriated as their contract had come to an end with the cessation of hostilities.
Lê Hữu Tho remembers this period vividly, not least because it showed up
the mercurial side of the French, which raised in him the first serious concerns
about French commanders who behaved criminally and had no sense of
responsibility. During the “last meeting in the office of the French commander
at Oissel,” their superior, “a former officer of the Colonial Army [Armée
Coloniale], severe, haughty, who [had] treated them with contempt and bru-
tality, transformed himself into an old jumping jack with broken springs.”69
His Vietnamese protégés publicly gave him face by remaining silent and pre-
tending not to notice as he lost his voice and shed tears, but they were “secretly
enjoying his distress, his humiliation . . .” According to Lê Hữu Tho, “we
finally got our retribution!”70 The officer’s loss of face was complete, although
at their expense because he abandoned them at sunset with the company’s
only truck and “half the company’s” food provision.71 Unlike him, the eight
Vietnamese translators did not shirk their responsibilities.72 Although “[t]his
war had never been theirs” and the members of the company already saw
themselves returning to their villages, their families, and their rice fields, they
were now in charge of the company and decided to leave Oissel “in order to
escape the German army.”73
During this flight, which was far from representative as most companies
were based in the south and thus in safe distance from the German onslaught,
Lê Hữu Tho’s th Company encountered the generosity of the French popu-
lation and administrators, but they also encountered some negative responses,
in particular from frustrated French refugees.74 It also brought -year-old Lê
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Hữu Tho, the elected spokesperson, closer to the men of his company. They
appear to have chosen him because he had the highest social background and
educational attainment, and because he had the language skills by which he
could help them.75 A few days later, the first German advance party caught up
to them and ordered them to follow the party to Amboise Castle (Indre-
et-Loire, Centre, near Tours).76 Unlike the Algerian and Moroccan soldiers
assembled in the castle’s courtyard, the Indochinese workers were not consid-
ered prisoners of war.
After a few days under German supervision, the th Company was
transferred back into French hands and directed by a French officer to a
MOI camp near Tours where two other companies with powder-factory
workers from Northern Annam were already gathered.77 After a few days,
the seven hundred fifty or so men embarked on a multi-day train journey
covering at least half a thousand kilometers. This time, freight cars provided
temporary mobile camps, which brought them right to the entrance of the
Sorgues Camp (eight kilometers northwest of Avignon), opposite the ammuni-
tion factory.78 The Sorgues camp, with about four thousandmen, was one of the
key camps for the Indochinese following the armistice. The th Company’s od-
yssey ground to a halt; instead of returning to French Indochina, they began
camp life.
F R O M A R M I S T I C E T O T H E L A S T T R A N S P O R T B A C K : U N E M P -
L O Y M E N T A N D T H E E N D O F H O P E S O F R E P A T R I A T I O N
( J U N E  T O S E P T E M B E R )
Unbeknownst to the workers of the th Company, the emerging Vichy gov-
ernment, led by the octogenarian Maréchal Philippe Pétain (–), had
negotiated with the Germans so that those Indochinese workers who had been
captured by the Wehrmacht would return under French control.79 Because
the État Français had also agreed to the division of France into a German-
occupied zone [zone occupée] with very few if any sovereign rights for Vichy
in it, and a free zone [zone libre] in which Vichy had most of the rights of
administration, all the Indochinese outside the free zone appeared to have
been brought back into it.80
The change in France’s political regime, the État Français, effectively ended
the Third French Republic and brought an end to the wartime labor regime of
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the Indochinese ONS. Contractually, their terms of service had come to an
end with the French defeat and this gave rise to hopes that they would be re-
patriated, and thus exit their labor contracts and the French labor camps. For
, of the ONS, this eventually meant they were given the opportunity to
embark for home in the course of , although fifty-six workers are recorded
to have died while two ship journeys ended prematurely in Oran (Algeria) and
South Africa.81 By the end of , however, British control of the sea-lanes
effectively forbade maritime connections between Vichy France and the
pro-Vichy Decoux administration in French Indochina. The remaining
Vietnamese workers’ hopes of being repatriated were thus cruelly crushed.
How would this affect their attitudes in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty?
It is during this period that the MOI decided to lease as many of the work-
ers as possible to the private sector for agricultural and other work. To the
exploitation by the MOI, a monopolistic state-sanctioned leasing agency, was
now added the possibility of exploitation by the various employers the work-
ers found themselves subcontracted to.82 While this provided an escape from
the camps, and relative idleness for some companies due to lack of work in
the aftermath of the French defeat, it led to new employments, often in the
private rather than the defense sector, and the first significant manifestation
of collective voice.
Perhaps the most serious case during this time period was the nd Com-
pany’s refusal to work in August , at a time when any remaining hopes of
quick repatriation were coming to an end. Leased by theMOI to the salt works
of Salin-de-Giraud (Bouches-du-Rhône, about forty kilometers from Arles)
where working conditions were particularly trying, the workers went on
strike. Even orders by the police [gendarmerie] were not sufficient to get the
Indochinese workers back to work.83 Instead of improving the working con-
ditions or at least their pay, the main concern of the Secretary of State of the
Colonies, Counter-Admiral Charles Platon (–), was the strike’s pos-
sible effect on other workers, which he generally saw as being influenced by
“tendentious outside propaganda.”84
Should the men of the nd Company have ever harbored any plans to
be evicted from France due to their striking actions, their hopes came to
naught. Hence, Henri Maux (–), the Director of the Commission
for the Struggle against Unemployment [Commissariat à la Lutte Contre le
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Chômage (CLC)], which at the time was in charge of the MOI, countered
Platon’s proposal to return the workers to Indochina on grounds that it would
encourage other workers to do the same. To ensure that this potential exit door
would remain closed, Maux ordered the dissolution of the nd Company and
its reconstitution as the th Company, therefore putting it at the bottom of the
list of returnees; he also made sure they would return to Salin-de-Giraud.85
T H E C A M P S I N T H E Z O N E L I B R E : T O W A R D S A N A G R I C U L T U R A L
P H A S E ( S E P T E M B E R  T O N O V E M B E R )86
By the time of the nd Company’s strike, the reorientation of the workers to-
wards new tasks, primarily away from the defense industries, had already be-
gun. Many of the eventually less than fifteen thousand workers remaining in
free zone were orientated—essentially subcontracted by the MOI—towards
other jobs because Vichy was no longer permitted to produce ammunition.
This eventually provided the workers an opportunity to escape the narrow
and militarized confines of the large camps and to be exposed to forestry
work, such as tree felling to extract carburant and agricultural work, in partic-
ular various types of harvest (oak glands, salt, and so forth). Interestingly, in
mid  Vichy gave orders that Vietnamese be used for the cultivation of rice
in the Camargue, the Aude, and around Bergerac, with impressive results, in
particular in the Camargue.87 Thus, the men of the Sorgues camp who formed
the Third Legion of Indochinese Workers [Troisième Légion des Travailleurs
Indochinois] worked throughout the Provence region, which allowed them to
earn a very modest monthly pay [pécule].88 This pay could be exchanged for
food, which meant that those outside the camps often got better food than
those inside.89 Yet, as we had seen in the particularly dire case of the nd Com-
pany, French employers and the MOI could also exploit the subcontracting.
What was camp life like at that time? Although it is difficult to generalize
due to the plurality of camps, we know that at least in Sorgues the workers
lived in brick buildings covered with roofing tiles, and initially were “relatively
comfortable.”90 The ceremonial center of the camp was a large flagpole and its
disciplinary counterpart was a menacing white-colored prison, both of which
had been built by Colonel de la Pommeraie, who was in charge of the camp,
together with a Vietnamese deputy, Cao Văn (Sen).91 Another key character
ensuring discipline in the camp was Deputy Georges, nicknamed “Hitler” not
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only for his moustache but because he headed the camp’s “internal police” and
directed thirty “policemen” armed with “heavy truncheons” against those who
infringed the  p.m. curfew, gamblers and the “undisciplined, slackers,
drunkards.”92 The camp’s “colonialist regime,” “abuse of power,” and system-
atic “oppression” caused a “painful break” with France, “the land of the Rights
of Man and of Liberty.”93
Already during this agricultural phase, getting enough food became “the
crucial question for everyone.”94 Food became particularly scarce in  as
hunger and an “obsession” with eating set in.95 The lack of food was com-
pounded by particularly cold weather and the inability of the MOI to replace
the worn-out clothing of the workers and to provide new shoes.96 It is surpris-
ing that these conditions, especially after the expectation of speedy repatria-
tion had all but vanished by the end of , did not produce more exit
attempts such as desertion and open voice. However, after the initial chaos fol-
lowing French defeat, the conditions for return to Indochina remained as poor
as ever and actually required French support and capacity, both of which were
not given due to Allied control of the sea-lanes. Desertion was also an unlikely
option at this stage for most of the ONS because of their lack of French-lan-
guage skills and their ethnicity, which would have made it easy for them to be
identified and punished. Moreover, there was hardly anyone outside the
camps to provide the workers with moral and material support. Thus, the
small Vietnamese community in France, many of whom were of higher social
and educational status, did not reach out to the ONS during the early war
years. The French resistance was in its infancy and had no use for these for-
eign workers yet. Moreover, the French communists pursued a united front
policy against fascism rather than one of class warfare, thus also affecting the
French unions.
The interpreter-overseers with their French-language skills arguably would
have had a better chance at desertion, but their educational level (and higher
pay) already allowed them to make more confident forays outside the camps
and to connect with French men and women. Through their higher rate of
contact with the French within but also outside the camps, they learned to dis-
tinguish between good and bad French people, whereas many of the ONS did
not have these opportunities for encounters and most felt that the French
looked down upon them.97 Moreover, the interpreters and supervisors had far
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more in their interest to remain, at least formally, loyal to the organization,
even though the great majority resented the arrogance and abuses of certain
commanders. Yet even with no viable exit doors open, the interpreters and
supervisors were still better off than the ordinary workers. Their intermediary
status in the camps allowed them to profit from their situation, for example,
by writing letters in return for cigarettes. However, quite a few of them pro-
vided public goods and services, such as language courses.98 By serving loyally,
the vast majority of the interpreters and supervisors expected to maintain or
even increase their status, which was also very important in the case of their
eventual return to French Indochina. As a result, their biggest unspoken fear
was to be demoted to the rank of an ordinary ONS.99
Although Lê Hữu Tho was no troublemaker and liked by his own men, he
was indignant about how the French commander abandoned his company in
 and about the prison at Sorgues that had been built for the Vietnamese
workers who had come to France to support the war effort.100 Yet, despite him
and other interpreters giving Vietnamese-language classes to illiterate work-
ers, he was an unlikely revolutionary or agitator in terms of family back-
ground, personality, and opportunities. It was only by accident that he
contested the camp’s hegemonic order in early  when he stopped two
young girls who were cycling past and eyed them up a bit “insolently,” like
“tourists who visit historical monuments or animals in the zoo.”101 As it
turned out, the girls were Commander de la Pommeraie’s daughters, and Lê
Hữu Tho had to pay the price for his nondeferential challenge to the camp’s
racialized and gendered colonial order. He was punished with eight days in
prison and the cassation of his rank of interpreter.
Although coming from the same pool of interpreters, Hoàng Khoa Khôi
was of a more rebellious nature.102 From a well-off third-generation Catholic
family from Nam Định Province in Tonkin, he was an agnostic and had
signed up in order to escape the confines of family life.103 Hoàng Khoa Khôi
would eventually emerge as a key Vietnamese Trotskyist leader. After a brief
stint at a powder (ammunition) factory in Roanne (Loire, central France),
he engaged in his first acts of contesting the labor regime at the camp of
Vénissieux (Rhône, south of Lyon).104 As a result of his involvement in a hun-
ger strike of over a thousand ONS in late , he would serve more than
three months in the Sorgues labor camp prison in .105 This experience,
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however, still did not make him a revolutionary as he lacked a convincing
ideology and revolutionary techniques of agitation and mobilization. But it
provided him with an exit because a Vietnamese friend, Vu Quôc Phan [sic],
who worked at the heart of the MOI put a word in for him with the organiza-
tion’s head of the Indochinese section, Francis Toudet.106 Hoàng Khoa Khôi
simply could not refuse the offer to escape the stifling atmosphere of the
camps and to collaborate in a monthly paper entitled Công Binh [Worker
Soldiers] to entertain his Vietnamese comrades.107
T H E C A M P S I N T H E Z O N E S U D : R E T U R N T O I N D U S T R I A L
O C C U P A T I O N (–)108
Access to sufficient food and clothing continued to be a problem during the
next camp phase because the political changes brought about by military ac-
tion in late  would again have an impact on the labor regime governing
the Indochinese and camp life. On November , , Germany began the
occupation of the relatively autonomous free zone in order to counter the Al-
lied assault building up in the southern Mediterranean. This not only led to
direct responses by the French Resistance movement and German counterac-
tions, but German requests for Indochinese workers to support the German
war effort.109 As a result, “ percent of the Indochinese” eventually “worked
directly or indirectly” for the Germans.110 This included working in the am-
munition factories again.111 The Germans also requested Indochinese to work
for them in Germany, but these attempts appear to have been thwarted by the
French administration, apparently to protect the workers.112 Workers were
also requisitioned for the Todt Organization [Organisation Todt] (by then un-
der Albert Speer) to build, among other things, an equivalent to the Atlantic
Wall in order to defend German-occupied southern France against an Allied
attack from the Mediterranean.113 For those back in the factories, it meant a
return to unhealthy working conditions, the monotony of industrial produc-
tion, and eight-hour shifts, including nightshifts. The threat of Allied attacks
weighed particularly heavy on those in the defense industry and was even
more pronounced for those requisitioned into the Todt Organization.114
During the industrial phase, instances of individual voice to address
abuses—but with a sense of loyalty to improve the system—occurred to a very
limited extent. At Sorgues, Deputy Commander [Commandant-Adjoint] Cao
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Văn took the initiative, bypassing Colonel de la Pommeraie, to send a report
to the MOI headquarters on the penury of the Third Legion.115 The MOI re-
sponded and sent some relief. Yet, the misappropriation of funds, goods, or
labor continued in many places and added to scarcities in several camps.
Colonel de la Pommeraie was eventually relieved of his administrative respon-
sibilities in early  after his deputy, Cao Văn, informed the MOI that the
commander had stolen foodstuff for the wedding of his son during which,
moreover, inhabitants of the camp were used as servants.116 The Ministry of
Colonies even sent an information secretary, His Excellency Hoang Van Co
[sic], to investigate.117 While Lê Hữu Tho greeted his arrival approvingly,
many of the problems within the camps, including the lack of foodstuffs, were
systemic.
In particular, the lack of food and proper clothing, such as new shoes, sub-
stantially worsened during that time period. Most of the interpreters and over-
seers were better prepared for it. Lê Hữu Tho, for example, had the fortune of
having a young French teacher, his future wife, support him by sacrificing her
leather satchel for his new pair of shoes.118 Most of the unskilled workers,
however, were insufficiently attractive to French women, in terms of language
skills and also financial standing. In order to survive, many workers resorted
to stealing outside the camp rather than claiming food inside. According to
Đặng Văn Long (March , –), who was from a poor family in Hải
Dương Province in Tonkin, animals such as “rabbits, sheep, chicken, [. . .] and
even cattle and dogs” fell victim to the voracious appetite of the workers who
also stole “vegetables” and ate “wild herbs.”119 The workers even honed the art
of stealing by walking a sufficient distance from the camp so that less suspi-
cion would fall on them, though this did not prevent many of them from serv-
ing prison terms.120 Đặng Văn Long also notes that “only perhaps the cooks,
the orderlies, and the administrative staff” did not steal, thus highlighting
how occupational position, but also “class” or educational level, did have an
impact.121
Desertion, the only form of exit available under the camp system other
than death or withdrawal, appears to have picked up in about – and
become quite common after liberation. The future artist Le Ba Dang, who by
then had experienced a German prisoner-of-war camp and a French disciplin-
ary camp among others, deserted in  because “it was so horrible that [he]
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was forced to find a way out.”122 Initially sleeping rough, he then slept in a
cave with another ONS and survived by getting a job as a factory sweeper in
Toulouse, which allowed him to later enroll in an art school. He remains con-
vinced that the authorities knew where he was but did not do anything to
bring him back into the MOI system. Another deserter was Monsieur X (born
), a supervisor who was sent to Vichy in  but then deserted to Paris by
train, where other “comrades who had left before him” provided him accom-
modations for several weeks.123 Outside support for deserters was crucial—in
both these cases, it was provided by Vietnamese, and in Monsieur X’s case,
even a network of friends. Moreover, an urban rather than rural context ap-
pears to have been crucial for these men to disappear and find employment.124
The same favorable desertion conditions applied to Hoàng Khoa Khôi, the
rebel turned journalist for the MOI’s monthly Công Binh who found himself
in Paris after the relocation of the administrative section of the MOI in early
. Although that job was a closer reflection of his intellectual abilities, he
deserted later in the same year. Despite being one of the few interpreters will-
ing to organize collective voice on behalf of the ONS, it is interesting that his
decision to desert was caused by his inability to accept being demoted again
after he had sent, together with nine other ONS, a letter complaining about
the “mismanagement” of foodstuffs meant for the Vietnamese in Paris.125
In Paris he found a room that he shared with another deserter, Trần Văn
Long, and was close with Ðào Gia Trung, also a former contributor to Công
Binh.126 A chance encounter would bring Hoàng Khoa Khôi in touch with
Hoàng Ðôn Trí ( or –July , ) and Nguyễn Ðược, two Vietnam-
ese students of the École Centrale Paris, a prestigious university-level school
[grande école] for engineering then located in the third arrondissement, who
would instruct him, Trần Văn Long, and Ðào Gia Trung in Marxism.127
It was through them that he chose Trotskyism over the communist party; he
regarded the former as better defenders of workers’ rights. Moreover, the
Trotskyists, unlike the communist party, supported his efforts to organize in
the camps.
Was it really a chance encounter? As early as July , , Hoàng Ðôn Trí
had resolved to support his Indochinese compatriots after he witnessed the ar-
rest (and later deportation) of a Jewish family with whom he was on friendly
terms.128 He had become “sentimentally attached to the Fourth International”
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through one of his teachers in mid-s Sài Gòn, the Trotskyist leader Tạ
Thu Thâu, and after arriving in France to study at the École Centrale Paris in
 he established contacts with French Trotskyists.129 It was this event that
ignited his life-long commitment to the revolutionary cause. Hoàng Ðôn Trí
vowed to help Vietnamese deserters by lodging them and “trying to find them
work in Paris,” and began to set up a small group that included his friend
Claude Bernard (“Raoul” to the Trotskyists, –)—one of the few
French interested in the plight of the Indochinese. A bit later the trio was com-
plemented by “N’guyen Duoc [sic].”130 By the summer of , using material
from the Vietnamese Friendship Association [Amicale des Vietnamiens]
headquartered in Paris, they had distributed their first tracts and were thus
able to reach out to the Indochinese workers (and soldiers). But at the same
time they came to realize the limitations of their approach: many of the
workers were illiterate. At this stage, however, their competitive advantage was
that they were the only organization against the camp system actively trying
to reach out to the Indochinese Camp Diaspora with their message that one
had to struggle against colonialism and fascism rather than, as held by the
communists, postpone the struggle against colonialism for the sake of pushing
back fascism.
Trotskyists were not the only ones to reach out to the Indochinese workers
and soldiers by this time, as some members of the Maquis, which became far
more active in the south with the German occupation of the former free zone,
saw the advantage of establishing contact with this population. Đặng Văn
Long recalls that at the end of  “many workers joined the FFI [French
Forces of the Interior; Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur] . . . because of the bad
living conditions in the camps.”131 He is adamant it was “not for political
reasons” that they joined, but it is difficult to see how participation in this
movement did not also provide them with a sense of dignity and purpose.
In Bergerac, headquarter of the Second Legion, about two hundred fifty work-
ers joined the resistance in , a number that would more than triple in
.132 With many groups in the Maquis close to the communist-created
irregular French Riflemen and Partisans [Francs Tireurs et Partisans Français
(FTPF)], some of the workers eventually established their connection with the
communists, and through them, the labor unions. While such activities of
contact would accelerate only with the process of the liberation of France and
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generally come to an end after liberation, it nevertheless represented the
expansion of options for the Vietnamese and a strengthening of voice. As a
result, with Vietnamese Trotskyists and organizations of the Maquis reaching
out to the workers, more options would eventually be open to them rather
than simply staying in the camps and hoping for a passage back home.
By this stage, however, many of the Vietnamese workers were too sick or
had already died. The frequently bad working conditions and insufficiencies
in food and clothing took their toll and created a rather sinister mode of exit.
As of January , , , of the original , workers had died: twenty-one
in work-related accidents, thirty-four in non-work-related accidents and mur-
ders, seven in suicides; but more than  percent of deaths were due to tuber-
culosis ( cases) and other diseases ( cases).133 Some drank themselves to
death, such as Lê Hữu Tho’s devoted orderly, Linh, a physically strong former
provincial wrestling champion demoralized by separation from his family and
one-year-old son, who accidentally drowned in a twenty-centimeter-deep
creek in mid .134 For those who developed tuberculosis, medical support
was inadequate and the infamous hospital Le Dantec in Montolivet (now a
part of the twelfth arrondissement of Marseille) appears to have replicated the
worst abuses of the camp system.135 Two ONS are alleged to have been mur-
dered shortly after they lodged a formal complaint against the hospital’s doc-
tors and male nurses.136
What Forms of Exit/Voice? When and Why Did They Become
More Pronounced?
The working and living conditions during the Second World War were hard
and affected the Vietnamese workers far more than the French civilian popu-
lation.137While there appears to have been hard work but sufficient food prior
to the French defeat, access to food and replacement of outworn clothing be-
came a life-threatening problem for many as the war went on. Economic
grievances within the camps were severe and systemic and made worse by the
profiteering of those in the right positions who could not resist the temptation
to take advantage for themselves. Added to this were clear injustices within the
camps, such as illegal economic exploitation by Vietnamese and French supe-
riors, which was made worse by the workers being subject to an imperial, mil-
itarized, and racialized manpower regime on French soil.
 R E T T I G
Considering that the grievances were significant and sometimes life-
threatening, and that many men had known each other since late  when
they were first formed into companies, it is surprising that more individual or
collective reactions to address their bad situation did not arise. There was rel-
atively little individual or collective voice contesting conditions in the camps,
and when they occurred, they frequently ended with the system prevailing.
Certain actions were successful in bringing some relief but did not substantial-
ly change the system as such. In terms of exit, very few dared to venture away
on their own; the risks were perceived to be too high and remaining in the
camps appeared more secure. Moreover, the most likely candidates to gener-
ate voice—the French-educated interpreters and wardens—were in a situation
where loyalty made the most sense to them. This configuration of interests
would remain until the Allied invasion and liberation of France allowed for
more voice and opened up new doors.
The Reconfiguration of the Vietnamese Camp Diaspora:
Emergence of Collective Action
T H E O P E N I N G U P O F T H E C A M P S T H R O U G H E X I T A N D V O I C E
As we have seen, voice and exit were limited options throughout most of the
– period, although this began to slowly change in late  and in
particular with the liberation of France in full swing in . Although France
had been defeated, political order was soon restored by the Vichy govern-
ment and further maintained with the German occupation of the free zone
in November . Contestations of the militarized regimes in the camps
could easily be quelled by demoting those perceived to be leaders, by impris-
onment, and by sending potential troublemakers to other companies and
camps.138 Moreover, the MOI also undertook some attempts to improve the
situation in the camps, such as the replacement of some particularly abusive
French leaders. Arguably, however, it would require a political vacuum creat-
ed by a change in political regime, in addition to outside support, to facilitate
the emergence of a political and class-consciousness and changes at a collec-
tive level.
Although the Allies had begun to assert themselves in the Mediterranean
through successful conclusion of their North African campaign in mid-May
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 and the first victories in the long drawn-out Italian campaign that began
with the invasion of Sicily (July to August), the liberation of southern France
did not begin until August , . This was more than two months after the
Normandy landings and a mere ten days before the liberation of Paris on Au-
gust , . While many Indochinese were just struggling to survive, some
incidents of voice and exit by means of desertion nevertheless occurred in the
intervening period, including the first time a very small outside organization
took an interest in the plight of the workers.
By early , the small Trotskyist group in Paris composed of Hoàng Ðôn
Trí (also known as “Gilbert”), Claude Bernard (“Raoul”), and Nguyễn Văn
Ðược (“Pierre”) had managed to reach out to several Indochinese deserters.
Among them were a handful of interpreters, such as Hoàng Khoa Khôi, who
knew the camp system inside out due to having contested it and having been
placed at one of its central organizational spots.139 Including unskilled work-
ers who deserted, this group would total about fifteen. However, some did not
have the temperament to be activists while the workers generally lacked the
educational background to be successful militants.140 In fact, some may have
been part of this group mainly out of gratitude for having been helped.141 De-
spite the very modest size of this group of four interpreters (Hoàng Khoa
Khôi, Nguyễn Văn Liên, Bùi Thạnh, and Đặng Văn Long) and some sympa-
thizers, it was a fair amount considering the impending atmosphere of regime
change and interregnum characterized by a power vacuum, not to mention
the reinvigorated French labor movement and resistance.142 The group would
consequently play a crucial role in the emergence of voice not just within the
camps, but also among the Vietnamese community in France. In March ,
these Trotskyists set up the La Lutte [Tranh Đấu; The Struggle] Group to
reach out to the camps.143
The general strike of May  in Marseille, in which Indochinese soldiers
[tirailleurs] participated, was a sign that the tide of war was changing and that
the Vichy regime was on the defensive. It is not known whether ONS joined
the soldiers, but in late May a two-day hunger strike broke out in the
Mazargues camp.144 The Indochinese workers were “protesting against the
reduction of food rations” and did not give in even when the camp’s com-
mander, Colonel Yung, threatened to call in German troops to shoot two
hundred among the strikers.145
 R E T T I G
Prior to and particularly during the liberation of France, the number of
desertions and defections to the Maquis went up considerably. Although the
Indochinese soldiers appear to have been far more active, and also because
they were more useful in that they knew how to handle weapons, “the th at
Cajarc [Lot] and the th Company at Brives provided cadres, food and mate-
rial.”146 At the time of liberation, the “st Company at Saint-Gervais fought
with the FFI,” whereas elsewhere some “ONS [. . .] rescued American wound-
ed under enemy fire” or “prevented the routed Germans from blowing up a
bridge.”147 The number of “deserters” to join the resistance at Bergerac
suddenly swelled from two hundred in  to about nine hundred during the
actual liberation period.148 In southeastern France, an October  investiga-
tion by an indigenous MOI agent showed that two thousand workers had
joined the resistance; the three hundred men who had joined a resistance reg-
iment in Marseille included “cassated grades.”149
The majority of these men would eventually return to the MOI as they
soon obtained major, though internally contested, concessions that gave them
higher salaries, the right to syndicate and to be “free laborers,” and the promise
of professional training.150 Others would become active only after liberation,
such as the th Company at Nîmes under Trần Ngọc Diệp, who would
appoint himself captain, have his erstwhile superiors arrested on grounds of
collaboration, and eventually join the FTPF, the resistance army set up by the
French Communist Party in late .151 Together with the MOI music band
and the rd Company they would form the “battalion of Vietnam” [bataillon
du Viêt-nam].152
The “bataillon du Viêt-nam” constituted an extreme form of Vietnam-
ese exit combined with voice by means of self-organization in the chaos of
the Allied landing and liberation of France. But in many of the camps,
too, the old colonial and Vichyist order was questioned if not rejected.
Among the milder measures was the hanging of Charles de Gaulle’s por-
trait beside Philippe Pétain’s.153 Punitive actions were taken against those
too closely associated with the repressive camp order. Hence Adjutant
Georges at Sorgues got a severe beating and was left for dead but recov-
ered due to his robust disposition (and never complained), whereas others
who were deemed corrupt, Vichyist, or too francophile were beaten up or
imprisoned.154
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The extent of outside support and its impact would arguably differ from
camp to camp, but the liberation of France—starting in June with the Nor-
mandy landings and finalized in late August with the capture of Paris and
Operation Dragoon—was a major turning point. It would provide Hoàng
Khoa Khôi, the budding Trotskyist, with the opportunity to connect again
with the workers in the camps and to agitate among them as an anticolonial
communist rather than declaring his true Trotskyist colors.155 Tracts were dis-
tributed and demonstrations and hunger strikes organized, and newspapers
and loudspeakers provided some of the means of communication with the
camps’ inhabitants.
On August , , less than two weeks before the liberation of Paris on
August , the Trotskyist cell in charge of the Indochinese workers decided to
put forward a policy of “duality of power” in hopes of creating an alternative
power structure to replace the existing one that was ultimately provided by the
French imperial nation-state.156 This included “the idea of a representative body
of the Indochinese in France” to be “in duality of power with the Ministry of
Colonies and . . . the M.O.I.” and an “appeal to the workers’ camps [to] form
committees” to set up a “duality of power with the camps’ administration.”157
Drawing on the networks of the Vietnamese Friendship Association, the small
Trotskyist group reached out to the Vietnamese community and the nationalist
intellectuals in the Paris region and called for a general assembly on September
, .158 Attended by about two hundred Vietnamese, the assembly decided
to set up a Provisional Representative Committee of the Vietnamese [Tong Uy-
Ban Daidien Tam Thoi (Tổng Ủy-Ban Đại-Diện Tạm Thời)] in France, into
which fifteen members were elected on the spot. The majority were nationalist
intellectuals but there were two Trotskyists among them.
The Provisional Committee decided to reach out to the workers and sol-
diers in the camps in southern France by calling upon them to elect their rep-
resentatives. Throughout October , assemblies were constituted in the
camps and they elected delegates who compiled booklets of demands [cahiers
de revendications].159 On October , , the delegates requested that the
MOI grant them the same rights as French workers and that each company
have the right to elect “delegates recognized by the [. . .] M.O.I.”160 From
December –, , more than half a year prior to the August Revolution,
Vietnamese intellectuals and worker delegates from all over France gathered
 R E T T I G
at a National Congress in Avignon.161 This congress constituted the General
Delegation of Indochinese in France [Délégation Générale des Indochinois en
France; Ban Tông Dai-Dien Viêt Nam tai Phap (Ban Tổng Đại-Diện Việt
Nam tại Pháp)], which was mindful of using the term “Indochinese” in the
French title so as to not shock French sensitivities too much but adopted the
term “Việt Nam” for their Vietnamese audience.162 The congress’ initial agen-
da was to request that the French authorities give Vietnamese workers the
same rights as their French counterparts, notably the right to organize. The
other request was the “establishment of a democratic regime in Indochina,”
which required the universal right to vote and a political system in which the
government had to answer to an elected chamber.163 Although this remained
within the framework of de Gaulle’s Brazzaville Declaration, it is likely that
many among the participants saw it as a stepping-stone for full indepen-
dence.164 Interestingly, dominated as it was by students and intellectuals, the
congress did not call for the immediate repatriation of the workers.
By the end of , the ONS had massively expressed their dissatisfaction
with their status as subaltern colonial workers; in some of the camps, they had
even established themselves as the de facto power. Many workers used the
chaos of liberation to “vote with their feet” by deserting the MOI, and in many
cases, defect to the resistance. During this period of interregnum when one re-
gime was being replaced by another, their options also included voice. They
exercised this by voting in delegates at the company level in order to represent
their claims towards the authorities, which in some cases had disappeared
from the camps. The MOI’s monopolistic grip on them had at least been tem-
porarily broken, while various groups and organizations suddenly took an ac-
tive interest in them: the French resistance, French labor unions, the small
group of Trotskyists, and nationalist intellectuals and students. Overwhelmed
by the wave of (mostly) civil disobedience, the MOI had to make concessions.
The MOI purged dishonest administrative personnel and, rather reluctantly,
accepted the right of the workers to syndicate, auto-organize in the camps,
and compete on the French market as free workers. Moreover, it offered to
provide workers with professional training.165
While these were significant achievements and it looked like the workers
were on the ascendancy, the story of the ONS would not end on a high note.
Their greatest desire, to return to French Indochina, would be delayed for
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most of them by three to seven years as the liberator of France, Charles de
Gaulle, needed all available ships to reoccupy French Indochina. Very few
workers and interpreters accepted the offer to join the French Expeditionary
Corps. Those who did join were eyed suspiciously by the French for fear they
would join the anti-French resistance upon return to Indochina. The large
majority of the ONS thus remained stranded in France, and many would find
it difficult to find a proper job or have a job at all, thus leading to frustration in
the camps. Some of their brightest members, usually from among the inter-
preters and supervisors, would use the opportunity to get a professional edu-
cation to formally leave the MOI, while many of the remaining leaders would
be rounded up by the French in  and sent back to French Indochina.
To further complicate matters, the emergence of Hồ Chí Minh’s communist-
controlled Việt Minh movement as the key representative of Vietnamese
independence would also lead to severe tensions within the camps. The adher-
ents of Trotsky would be pitted against the followers of Stalin, and the Việt
Minh’s elimination of Trotskyists in Indochina made the small Trotskyist
leadership extremely reluctant to be returned to Vietnam. As in , when
historical forces larger than these men had led to their shipment to France, the
postwar context was not propitious to their speedy return.
Conclusion
What were the changes that facilitated the assertion of an individual and even
collective Vietnamese will at the historical juncture of ? What allowed the
young conscripts and volunteers of , the vast majority of whom had no
political education and knowledge at all, to claim for their rights and even a
democratically elected government in Vietnam? Too much discontent had
been brewing within the camps so that it would only require the right situa-
tion or catalyst to make them switch from loyalty to exit or voice. These cata-
lysts included people and organizations, such as the Trotskyists, the resistance
movement, or labor unions, that expressed an interest in the workers, reached
out to them, provided them with a new sense of purpose, gave them dignity,
and stood up for them. The right situation was also crucial: the liberation from
German military occupation and the parallel breakdown of the Vichy state led
to a vacuum of power that facilitated exit and voice, whereas previously it
would have led to punishment and subjugation.
 R E T T I G
The breakdown of the existing power structures at the national and local
level, the temporary breakdown of the MOI during the liberation, and the
emergence of organizations that competed with it for the Indochinese work-
ers were thus necessary for the massive emergence of voice and exit. Even
though a lot of these sudden expressions of voice and exit may have appeared
opportunistic, they were clearly the result of more than four years of systemic
suppression.166
However, another crucial factor was the emergence of a new consciousness
that had developed over the last four years. The seemingly sudden outpouring
of exit and voice was the result of the workers’ and interpreters’ individual and
collective experiences as subaltern subjects, a position resented by illiterate
workers and educated supervisors and interpreters alike. In the eyes of the
Indochinese Camp Diaspora, the French had lost their “prestige” as a protec-
tive power because they had lost the war against Germany. They had also been
largely discredited, the usual exceptions of “good” Frenchmen aside, in their
daily interactions with the camp hierarchy. In fact, even if one takes into
account the special circumstances of the time, the camp universe held together
by the MOI had proven to be systemically flawed and very few of the
Indochinese felt compelled to manifest loyalty following the fall of Vichy.
The MOI was unjust economically and treated them as subaltern colonial
workers that were not allowed to return home even after their contract had
expired with France’s defeat, and it did not allow them access to the French
labor market as free workers.
This new consciousness certainly had also been nurtured by the daily camp
rituals and the camps’ military structure, the various ruptures and displace-
ments they had experienced, and their interaction with men from other com-
panies and other parts of French Indochina. While regional differences were
leveled to a certain extent and led to some element of a larger solidarity, the
relationship between the ordinary ONS and the socio-educationally more ad-
vanced supervisors and interpreters arguably had also undergone changes. Al-
though the relationship may have led to a better understanding between these
hitherto separate groups and a sense of common solidarity, the camp hierar-
chies could have also further accentuated the differences and led, particularly
if the Indochinese superiors had abused their power, to hostility and a ques-
tioning of the traditional Vietnamese relationship between the illiterate and
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the educated. Finally, the existing military-camp structure with its established
hierarchies and rituals, where the supervisors and interpreters occupied an
important intermediary role, arguably would have also facilitated the implan-
tation of an alternative, parallel power structure within the camps.
As the later history of the ONS in France would show, however, this collec-
tive consciousness—a rejection of their subaltern status as unfree colonial
workers—did not mean that they would all henceforth pursue the same exit,
voice, and loyalty strategies. The illiterate and educated were still separated
by social, educational, and experiential differences that would open different
opportunities, notably the possibility of integration into French society for the
latter.
While the primary focus of this paper has been to examine the emergence
and differences of imperial workers in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty strate-
gies in a French metropolitan context, it also raises the question of whether
Hirschman’s conceptual model could be applied to other Vietnamese (and
non-Vietnamese) diasporas to provide interesting insights. It would seem that
this model could provide not only a good conceptual overview of decisions to
migrate or flee, but also the articulation of diasporic identities that would give
us a better appreciation of diasporic preferences for certain types of exit (for
example, nostalgia), voice, and loyalty.167
Finally, despite several important differences, the eruption of voice and the
formulation of political-economic demands in conjunction with intellectuals
also suggests that we might advantageously compare the “ August Revo-
lution in the French camps” with the revolutionary high-tide of –, no-
tably the Nghệ-Tĩnh Soviets and the  August Revolution in Vietnam.
In all three cases, voice erupted and challenged French but also Vietnamese
feudal power; the largely illiterate cooperated with intellectuals even if the for-
mer did not fully grasp the finer ideological points. And in all three cases, in
particular in  and , there was a considerable military and administra-
tive vacuum of power.
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A B S T R A C T
In the second half of , the majority of the roughly fourteen thousand
Vietnamese workers who had arrived in France four years earlier, but remained
stranded there following France’s defeat in June , took advantage of the
power vacuum created by the liberation of France. They would launch a
diasporic-metropolitan precursor of the Vietnamese August Revolution of 
by successfully claiming workers’ rights and a sense of dignity they had
previously been denied. Loosely adopting Hirschman’s concepts of “exit, voice,
and loyalty,” this essay investigates the strategies chosen by this subaltern
imperial workforce to emancipate itself from the militarized labor camp system.
It argues that different interests led the largely illiterate workers and the French-
speaking supervisors and interpreters to opt for different strategies.
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from Overseas] (Cahors: – Editions, ), . For the number of
workers, see Duong Van Giao, L’Indochine pendant la Guerre de –:
Contribution à l’étude de la colonisation indochinoise [Indochina during the
War of –: Contribution to the Study of Indochinese Colonization]
(Paris: Jean Budry et Cie, ), .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, ; Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs
indochinois en France de  à ” [The Indochinese Workers in France
from  to ] (master’s thesis, Université de Paris  – Nanterre, ),
–. The page numbers I refer to are those of the pdf file: http://www.reseau–
terra.eu/article.html (accessed June , ).
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –; Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les
travailleurs indochinois en France de  à ,” –.
. I use the term “recruitment” for a voluntary contract, and “requisition” for a
non-voluntary contract. Although the workers inmany ways were administered
militarily, I do not use the term “conscription.”
. Ngo Van, Revolutionaries They Could Not Break: The Fight for the Fourth
International in Indochina, – (London: Index Books, ), ; and his
autobiographical Au pays de la Cloche fêlée: tribulations d’un Cochinchinois à
l’époque coloniale [In the Land of the Cloche fêlée (Cracked Bell): Tribulations of a
Cochinchinese during the Colonial Era] (Paris: L’Insomniaque, ), .
. For the administrative preparations for war, see, for example, Daum, Immigrés de
force, –; Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en
France de  à ,” –.
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu, “Les travailleurs indochinois en France,” Bulletin du Centre
d’histoire de la France contemporaine [Bulletin of the Center for History of
Contemporary France]  (): –.
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à
,” .
. Cambodia did provide some soldiers. The paper cannot go into the reasons for
the disproportionately small contribution of Cochinchina, which were largely
due to factors such as a more attractive labor market and weaker village control,
which led to more incentives to avoid service and increased chances to avoid
requisitioning in this frontier area, respectively.
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. For example, on November , , Georges Mandel declared on radio
that “orders had been given to make come a first batch of seventy thousand
workers; hundreds of thousands more could follow. . . . It will be very easy
to levy, dependent on the needs, new contingents of soldiers or workers.” See
“L’Empire français dans la guerre” [The French Empire at War], L’Illustration,
May , http://www.travailleurs–indochinois.org/ (accessed October , ).
. See http://www.travailleurs-indochinois.org/, an excellent and reliable site set
up by Joël Pham, son of one of these workers who often draws on Pierre
Angeli’s thesis, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde
Guerre mondiale, –” [The Indochinese Workers in France during the
Second World War, –] (PhD dissertation, Faculté de Droit, Université
de Paris, May , ).
. For example, see the  testimony of Đặng Văn Long in Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu
(Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à ,” ,
Appendix . Also see the  testimony of Nguyễn Văn Tê (born ) in
Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, .
. Administrative convenience aside, it is not clear whether there were ulterior
motives, such as to prevent solidarization or conflict between men from
different provinces, or because it was thought that the comfort of being
with people from the same province would lessen homesickness. Lê Hữu
Tho suggests that each company had eight translators. See his Itinéraire
d’un petit mandarin [Itinerary of a Little Mandarin] (Paris: L’Harmattan,
), .
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de 
à ,” . One ship did the journey twice. See http://www.travailleurs–
indochinois.org/.
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –. He was never again to see
his parents, who fell victim to the land reform.
. Ibid., .
. Ibid.
. This was similar to the First World War. For example, see Hue-Tam Ho Tai,
Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, ), .
. Ngo Van, Revolutionaries They Could Not Break, f.
. Governor of Cochinchina, November , , Rapport au Gouverneur Général,
File No: , Nouveau Fonds (NF), Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer (CAOM),
Aix-en-Provence, France; quoted fromNgo Van, Revolutionaries They Could Not
Break, ; and Pierre Brocheux, “L’occasion favorable: Les forces politiques
vietnamiennes pendant la seconde guerre mondiale” [The Opportune Moment:
The Vietnamese Political Forces during the Second World War], in L’Indochine
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française, – [French Indochina, –], ed. Paul Isoart (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, ), .
. Claude Hesse d’Alzon, La présence militaire française en Indochine, –
[The French Military Presence in Indochina, –] (Vincennes: Service
Historique de l’Armée de Terre, ), . It is not entirely clear whether this
refers to Cochinchina or more generally to French Indochina. Resistance to
recruitment in Cochinchina in fact continued well into  as the authorities
requisitioned men for armed service. See David W.P. Elliott, The Vietnamese
War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, –, vol. 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, ), .
. At least in Tonkin (rather than Annam), and in times of peace rather than war,
this meant that the deserter had to be replaced; additionally, the village could be
penalized and weapons and other items belonging to the army had to be
reimbursed if the deserter had not returned within fifteen days. See Eckert, Les
militaires indochinois, vol. , .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, . See also http://www.travailleurs–indochinois.
org/muu.htm, where Thiều Văn Mưu cites from his self-distributed book,
Un enfant loin de son pays [A Child Far Away from His Home Country]
(Vénissieux: ).
. Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. An estimated – percent according to Joël Pham’s well-researched website:
http://www.travailleurs–indochinois.org/ (Accessed July , ). Daum, Immigrés
de force, , suggests that  percent were requisitioned, assuming that noONS had
volunteered. See Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, , where she
mentions at least one who did volunteer.
. See http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificat_d’%C%Atudes_primaires (accessed
September , ). Taken between ages  and  in France, the exam for the
primary school certificate tested listening and writing skills, calculus, essay
writing, drawing or agricultural knowledge; it included an oral exam that tested
reading-recitation [lecture-récitation] and history-geography. In Vietnam, this
exam was often taken later because the Vietnamese students were taught in a
foreign language. See Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. The year of birth was often not accurate at the time for a variety of reasons, such as
lack of knowledge, differences in the Vietnamese and French counting systems,
or manipulation of the system to gain an advantage (for example, allowing an
older child to still attend primary school). For cases of system manipulation, see
the testimony of Hoàng Công Cẩn, who was born in  but declared to have
been born in , in Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –,  (brother-in-law), 
(caporal),  (adventure). Also seemy interviewwith him inGrenoble, July, .
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. Ibid.,  (little mandarin),  (master).
. Loose translation of “une inculture politique totale,” as reported in  by
Raoul (Claude Bernard, –), a French Trotskyist militant, on the
situation in the camps in ; cited in Pierre Broué, “Raoul: militant trotskyste”
[Raoul: Trotskyist Militant], Cahiers Léon Trotsky [Léon Trotsky Papers] no 
(): .
. By , there were no less than six ranks of interpreter and four ranks of
supervisor. See Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en
France de  à ,” .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –; Moguez appears to have
been from the Garde indigène, the paramilitary policing force present in each
province. See testimony of Hoàng Công Cẩn, in Luguern, Les travailleurs
indochinois requis, .
. For example, see the testimonies of Hà Mười (Mười Ðen),  years-old in
mid , in Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, ; and Le Ba Dang
(born ), in Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. Nhất Linh “Going to France” [Đi Tây], trans. Greg andMonique Lockhart, East
Asian History,  (December ): .
. Guy Scaggion, Kiem Pham-Van: L’évadé des Annexes [Kiem Pham-Van:
The Fugitive of the Annexes] (Bordeaux: Les Dossiers d’Aquitaine, ), .
PhamVan Kiem was born onMarch ,  in Annam; his parents had died in
 and  respectively; Ibid., .
. See http://www.travailleurs-indochinois.org/ (accessed July , ). The
most tragic case was the one of the workers of the th Company who got
accidentally decapitated by a ship’s cable; story confirmed by Hoàng Công
Cẩn’s testimony in Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, –.
. It is not noted where the escapes took place and if the deserters were entirely
unskilled workers. Furthermore, twenty-three Indochinese workers are
reported to have died en route, one disappeared, and thirty-three were
hospitalized, thus reducing the initial number by eighty-six men and taking
it down to , from an initial ,. See Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les
travailleurs indochinois en France de  à ,” , based on Angeli, “Les
Travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale,
–,” .
. See his testimony in Daum, Immigrés de force, ,  (family background).
. See testimony of Nguyen Van Liên (born ), in Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, ; drawing on and citing from an April ,  [sic]
report mentioned in Angeli, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la
Seconde Guerre mondiale, –,” .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, , based on his interview with Hoàng Khoa Khôi.
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. Ibid., . Date of death: “Hoang Khoa Khoi (Robert) – /,” Obituary by
Jean-Michel Krivine, www.inprecor.fr/article–inprecor?id= (accessed April
).
. For example, see the  testimony of Hoan Nguyen Trong (born ), who
had quickly risen from ONS to supervisor and then interpreter, and felt he was
“obliged to be just” and that he was “in between,” and tried to solve problems
informally; and Vu Quôc Phan (born November , ) from a well-off family
in Hà Nội who would occupy a key position within the Indochinese camp
universe and wanted to be “as just as possible.” See Daum, Immigrés de force, ,
–, and – respectively.
. For examples of “bootlickers,” see the testimony of Đặng Văn Long in Liêm-
Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à
,” , ; for “keeping to themselves,” see the testimony of Trần Công Giao
(born ) in Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Ibid.
. Ibid. Lê Hữu Tho’s account is not clear enough to know whether they were
aware it was a prison.
. See Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de
 à ,” –, for a more thorough account.
. Daum, Immigrés de force, . This regional concentration was in many respects
similar to that of the Vietnamese workers during the First World War.
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin,  and  (translators). Oissel is a
township eighteen kilometers south of Rouen in northwestern France.
. Testimony of Lê Hữu Tho in Daum, Immigrés de force, ; and Lê Hữu Tho,
Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, . Also see the testimony of Le Van Phu (born
), the son of a village notable from Hà Tĩnh, at Saint-Médard-en-Jalles, just
north of Bordeaux, in Daum, Immigrés de force, , , .
. Testimony of Lê Hữu Tho in Daum, Immigrés de force, ; and Lê Hữu Tho,
Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Testimony of Lê Hữu Tho in Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. Ibid. Also see Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. See testimony byMr. Hoàng Công Cẩn (born ), son of a government official
in Nghệ An, in Liêm-Khê Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, –.
Regrettably, he fails to provide dates, but this strike appears to have happened
prior to the French defeat according to the way it is presented in the testimony.
. Ibid., .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Ibid., .
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. Ibid., .
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., , –, –.
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., –, .
. Ibid., , .
. The Indochinese soldiers, in contrast, were treated as prisoners of war. See,
for example, Martin Thomas, “The Vichy Government and French Colonial
Prisoners of War, –,” French Historical Studies , no.  (Fall ):
–.
. This free zone would be occupied by the Germans (and an eastern part of it by
the Italians) in November  to defend against the Allies who had landed
in North Africa. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zone_libre (accessed May ,
).
. Of thirteen ships, eleven made it to French Indochina. (Of the initial seventy-
three companies, thirteen were sent back based on their company number: the
companies with low numbers had arrived first and were hence allowed to return
first.) The British forced the th, th, and th companies travelling on the Saint
Loubert Bie to disembark in South Africa in April ; these companies would
eventually make their way to Madagascar by . The Eridan was forced to
return and its workers would disembark in Oran (Algeria) in December . See
the website of Joël Pham, http://www.travailleurs–indochinois.org/, who bases the
information on Pierre Angeli’s thesis, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en France
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, –.”On the conditions in Oran, see
Pierre Daum, Immigrés de force: Les travailleurs indochinois en France, –
[Forced Immigrants: The Indochinese Workers in France, –] (Arles:
Actes Sud (Éditions Solin), ), –.
. Daum devotes several sections to the significant differences in the pay of “free”
and “unfree”workers, that is, “forced” Indochinese workers, and compares their
earnings with those of regular French workers. See Daum, Immigrés de force,
chapters , ,  in particular. Also see Alexandre Briano, Les travailleurs
coloniaux: Les oubliés de l’histoire, – et – [The Colonial
Workers: History’s Forgotten, – and –] (Toulon: Les Presses
du Midi, ), , for a particular case of fraud.
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –, – (particularly trying). Spatially separated
from the European workers so as to prevent contact, they were also not provided
with the regular work equipment given to their European counterparts, such as
glasses to protect them from the sun and boots to protect them from the cold
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ground in winter. Moreover, the MOI paid the ONS working at the saltworks less
for an entire day than the company’s lowest regular hourly salary. See comparison
of testimonies on pages  and .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, . It is questionable whether Platon had any evidence
for propaganda brought into the camps.
. Ibid., –. Maux’s daughter further mentions that he called to order the
French supervisors and attempted to improve the workers’ general conditions.
See AntoinetteMaux-Robert, La lutte contre le chômage à Vichy: Henri Maux, le
Juste oublié, – [The Struggle against Unemployment at Vichy: Henri
Maux, the Forgotten Righteous, –] (Panazol: Lavauzelle, ), .
It is unclear to what extent these measures were taken to heart and
implemented. In fact, she writes that her father’s later efforts, by then as
personnel director in the Ministry of Colonies, were “again largely insufficient.”
In fact, the Ministry of Colonies would qualify the workers’ living conditions as
“extremely mediocre” upon liberation. See idem., .
. Pierre Angeli called this fourteen-month period from September  to
November  the “période sylvestre” [forestry phase]. See Liêm-Khê
Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à ”
[The Indochinese Workers in France from  to ] (master’s thesis,
Université de Paris  – Nanterre, ), . She nevertheless notes that
the – period was often also characterized by unemployment. Her
 article of the same title mentions that this comprised tasks such as
“cutting wood and agricultural work” [la coupe de bois et dans les travaux
agricoles], .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –. The idea seems to have been Henri Maux’s,
then in charge of the MOI as head of the Commission for the Struggle against
Unemployment [Commissariat à la Lutte Contre le Chômage (CLC)], most
likely influenced by his three years (–) in charge of developing
Cochinchina’s Transbassac region for improved rice cultivation. See idem.,
n; and Maux-Robert, La lutte contre le chômage à Vichy, : .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, – and –. The core
camps of the other legions as of  were: First Legion at Lodève (Hérault),
Second Legion at Bergerac (Dordogne), Fourth Legion at Toulouse (Haute-
Garonne), and Fifth Legion at Marseille. See Benjamin Stora, “Les travailleurs
indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale” [Indochinese
Workers in France during the Second World War], Les Cahiers du
C.E.R.M.T.R.I. (Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur les Mouvements
Trotskyste et Révolutionnaires Internationaux) [Publications of the Study and
Research Center on the International Trotskyist and Revolutionary
Movements)], no.  (): .
F ROM SUBA L T E RN TO F R E E WORK E R : E X I T , V O I C E , AND LOYA L T Y 
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –. He earned extra money by
writing love letters (–), whereas some of the other interpreters and
supervisors appear to have abused their position by stealing.
. Ibid., ,  (comfortable). Also see photo dated April  from the catalogue
of the travelling exhibition on the Vietnamese workers, “Les travailleurs
indochinois de la seconde guerre mondiale, exposition itinérante réalisée à
partir du livre de Pierre Daum [. . .] Association Histoires Vietnamiennes
[The Indochinese Workers of the Second World War, Itinerant Exhibition
Realized Based on the Book by Pierre Daum, Vietnamese Histories Association],”
 (?), , at http://www.travailleurs-indochinois.org/exposition/presentation.
pdf (accessed December , ). Other camps had different buildings.
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin (Paris: L’Harmattan, ), .
According to Lê Huu Tho, he had worked in an important bank in Indochina
and was founder of the Sài Gòn Chamber of Commerce [Chambre de
Commerce de Saigon]. The railroad shunting yard of Nîmes (Gard) provided a
prison for the most difficult cases. Cao Văn had been put in place by Vichy ().
. Ibid., . Lê Hữu Tho leaves it open whether some of these “policemen”
were Vietnamese.
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., .
. Ibid., . He provides examples of food in the camp during this time period:
Jerusalem artichokes, carrots, turnips, spinach, a bit of rice, and three hundred
grams of bread per day, and twice a week, a hint of meat or dried fish. Inmy July ,
 interview, he told me they hunted for animals in the vicinity of the camp.
. There are numerous accounts depicting Vietnamese barefooted or in makeshift
clogs in the windy and icy cold of the Mediterranean winter. For example,
see Anh Van, “Les travailleurs vietnamiens en France: –,” Cahiers Léon
Trotsky no.  (December ):  (barefooted); Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un
petit mandarin,  (wooden clogs). Angeli, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en
France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, –,” , cited in Daum,
Immigrés de force,  (no boots in the saltworks during winter).
. For the ability to distinguish, see Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin.
See also various accounts in Luguern, Les Travailleurs indochinois requis,
notably Hoàng Công Cẩn’s, –. For instances of being looked down upon,
see several accounts in Luguern, Les travailleurs indochinois requis, and in
Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à
,” –.
. For writing letters, see Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –.
For language [alphabetization] courses, see Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit
mandarin, , ; and Daum, Immigrés de force, .
 R E T T I G
. See Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de
 à ,” , which draws on Angeli, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en
France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, –,” .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin,  (prison).
. Ibid., –.
. “Hoang Khoa Khoi (Robert) – /,” Obituary by Jean-Michel Krivine,
www.inprecor.fr/article–inprecor?id= (accessed April ).
. Daum, Immigrés de force, , .
. Ibid., –; “Hoang Khoa Khoi (Robert) – /,”Obituary by Jean-Michel
Krivine, www.inprecor.fr/article–inprecor?id= (accessed April ).
. Ngo Van, Au Pays d’Héloïse [In Héloïse’s Country] (Montreuil: L’Insomniaque,
), . Ngo Van does not make clear whether Hoàng Khoa Khôi was a
mere participant or one of the leaders. But it is clear that he did not support the
French, as they would have expected him to do. It was there that he would
encounter Đặng Văn Long, who would be imprisoned for three months for
having signed a petition against the camp’s commander; idem., . For prisons
as revolutionary incubators, see Peter Zinoman, The Colonial Bastille: A History
of Imprisonment in Vietnam, – (Berkeley: University of California
Press, ).
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –. This was in September ; at the same time,
he regained the rank of interpreter. Captain Toudet, a former colonial officer,
is described as very “humane” and taking an interest in other potential
troublemakers—although it is not clear what his motivation was to take the risk
of bringing them under his office.
. According to Hoàng Khoa Khôi, cited in Daum, Immigrés de force, , this
monthly had forty pages, with a print-run of three thousand copies, an editorial
team of five at Vichy, and a further five correspondents in the camps.
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), following Angeli, termed this the “industrial
period.” See her “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à ,” .
. The Vichy government had already set up the Compulsory Work Service
[Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO)] on September , , complemented by
the February ,  law that requisitioned the male cohorts of –. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_du_travail_obligatoire (accessed June ,
).
. Liêm-Khê Luguern, “Ni civil ni militaire: le travailleurs indochinois inconnu de
la Seconde Guerre mondiale” [Neither Civilian nor Military: The Unknown
Indochinese Worker of the Second World War], Le Mouvement Social [The
Social Movement] nos. – (April–September ): .
. Notably Sorgues, Saint-Chamas (Bouches-du-Rhône), Toulouse, and Bergerac.
See “Les travailleurs indochinois de la seconde guerre mondiale, exposition
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itinérante réalisée à partir du livre de Pierre Daum (. . .), Association Histoires
Vietnamiennes,” (?), , http://www.travailleurs-indochinois.org/
exposition/presentation.pdf (accessed December , ). The st and nd
companies were deployed to an artificial textiles factory producing parachutes
for the Germans at La Voulte-sur-Rhône (Ardèche). See Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire
d’un petit mandarin, , .
. Maurice Rives, “–: Les travailleurs indochinois en France” [–:
The Indochinese Workers in France], Hommes et Migrations [Men and
Migrations] no.  (April ): . Rives most likely referred to forced
enlistment in the STO. Interestingly, he also mentions that about a hundred
Indochinese were attracted by German promises of better pay and ended up in
northern Germany, near Hamburg.
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –; Rives, “–: Les travailleurs indochinois
en France,” . Peter Gaida has researched the organization in particular with
regards to France. For example, see his “Les camps de travail de l’Organisation
Todt en France, –” [The Labor Camps of the Todt Organization in
France, –], in Travailler dans les entreprises sous l’Occupation [Working
in Companies under theOccupation], eds. ChristianChevandier and Jean-Claude
Daumas (Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, ), –.
. For example, see Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –.
. Ibid., –.
. Ibid., . Colonel de la Pommeraie was replaced by Commandant Joué from the
Cavalry.
. For the conservative scholar Hoang Van Co, see Eric T. Jennings, Vichy in the
Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and
Indochina, – (Stanford: Stanford University Press, ), .
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Evidence provided by Đặng Văn Long to Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern) in
February , Appendix  of her thesis, “Les travailleurs indochinois en France
de  à ,” . This was confirmed by my interview with Lê Hữu Tho in
Grenoble, July , .
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Daum, Immigrés de force, ; yet page  mentions it was in .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –. When exactly he deserted is not known.
Originally from a village close to Tourane, X. was repatriated to Vietnam in 
and requested that Daum keep his identity anonymous.
. In a rural context, for example, by joining the Maquis, one had to count on
French support.
. Daum, Immigrés de force, –; page  mentions it was in .
 R E T T I G
. Ibid., .
. Ibid. It is not clear whether they had encountered the Vietnamese students
before or after desertion.
. Based on his written recollections in Stora, “Les travailleurs indochinois en
France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale,” –. The date was July , ,
according to his aforementioned article published under his pseudonym Anh
Van. See Anh Van, “Les travailleurs vietnamiens en France: –,” –.
For the alternative date of birth, which says he died at  years-old on July ,
, see Michel Lequenne’s “Hommage à Hoàng Don Tri” [Homage to Hoàng
Ðôn Tri], first published inHebdo Tout est à nous! [Hebdo Everything is Ours!]
on September , , and put online on October , , at http://www.europe-
solidaire.org/spip.php?article (accessed October , ). He was the
seventh son of a family of cultivators. One of his older brothers, Hoàng Ðôn Văn,
a member of the proto-communist Thanh Niên [Youth] League and later the
Indochinese Communist Party, pushed him in his education.
. Hoang Don Tri, “Raoul, Our Friend, Comrade and Brother,” in The Revolution
Defamed: A Documentary History of Vietnamese Trotskyism, ed. Al Richardson
(London: Socialist Platform, ), .
. Stora, “Les travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre
mondiale,” ; Nguyễn Văn Ðược in Ngo Van, Au Pays d’Héloïse, .
. Cited by Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France
de  à ,” .
. Ibid., . The total number of workers there in  or  is not provided, but
in , , workers were counted in Bergerac.
. Angeli, “Les travailleurs indochinois pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale,
–,” cited by Joël Pham, http://www.travailleurs–indochinois.org/. On
top of these, twenty-five workers had died on the original journey to France,
whereas fifty-six had died on the journey back in . The official sources
indicate that  percent of all workers died of pulmonary tuberculosis, but
Đặng Văn Long says it was mostly deep-vein [veineuse] tuberculosis. See Liêm-
Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à
,” , . (Brief online research indicates that pulmonary tuberculosis
can lead to deep vein thrombosis.) Statistics on how many died after January ,
, when they were still under the charge of the French, appear not to have
been compiled. It is quite likely that some more would have died of disease
during a stay in France that could have extended to , while it is known that
others would fall victim to French and intra-Vietnamese violence.
. Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, –.
. Ngo Van, Au Pays d’Héloïse, . It was closed in  and replaced by the
hospital Pierrefeu (in the Var), which would close in July–August .
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Also see, for example, the testimony by Đặng Văn Long in Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu
(Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de 1939 à 1948,” 68 and 157.
. Ngo Van, Au Pays d’Héloïse, . He does not provide dates or references to
documents.
. See Luguern, “Ni civil ni militaire,” , for a comparison that a Vietnamese
worker was about seven times more likely to die than a French civilian.
. For this practice, see for example, Lê Hữu Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit
mandarin, .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, – (motivation for desertion).
. Stora, “Les travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre
mondiale,” . See Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois
en France de  à ,” –; Broué, “Raoul: militant Trotskyste,” .
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de  à
,” .
. Trinh Van Thao, Les compagnons de route de Hô Chi Minh: Histoire d’un
engagement intellectuel au Viêtnam [Hồ Chí Minh’s Travelling Companions:
History of an Intellectual Engagement in Vietnam] (Paris: Karthala, ),
n.
. Ngo Van, Au Pays d’Héloïse, .
. Trinh Van Thao, Les compagnons de route de Hô Chi Minh, .
. Stora, “Les Travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre
mondiale,” , drawing on the Trotskyist publication La Vérité [The Truth] no.
, July , . For a slightly more dramatic version, see Ngo Van, Au Pays
d’Héloïse, .
. Rives, “–: Les travailleurs indochinois en France,” .
. Ibid., .
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de 
à ,” , drawing on Report by M. Le Quang Hao, File No: , Box No: ,
NF, Archives Nationales Section Outre-Mer (ANSOM) in Paris, now relocated
to CAOM.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., . “Free labor”meant, at least in theory, that they were no longer bound
to the MOI and therefore free to search for jobs on the French labor market.
. Rives, “–: Les travailleurs indochinois en France,” .
. Ibid. Raoul Salan (–) would briefly be in charge of this battalion. See
Raoul Salan, Mémoires, Vol. , Fin d’un empire: le sens d’un engagement, juin
–septembre  [Memoirs, Vol. , The End of an Empire: The Sense of
a Mission, June –September ] (Paris: Editions Presses de la Cité,
), .
. Rives, “–: Les travailleurs indochinois en France,” .
 R E T T I G
. For example, see Daum, Immigrés de force, – (Georges). Also see Lê Hữu
Tho, Itinéraire d’un petit mandarin, .
. Daum, Immigrés de force, .
. For the origins of the term, used by Trotsky and Lenin to describe transitional
periods, see, for example, Lawrence Jarach, “Anarcho-Communists, Platformism,
and Dual Power: Innovation or Travesty?” http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/
Lawrence_Jarach__Anarcho–Communists__Platformism__and_Dual_Power__
Innovation_or_Travesty_.html#toc (accessed October , ).
. Stora, “Les travailleurs indochinois en France pendant la Seconde Guerre
mondiale,” , citing from Raoul, Rapport interne de la Commission Coloniale
du PCI, , “Bref historique du groupe bolchevik-léniniste-indochinois,”
Archives of the CERMTRI, Paris. This was in line with the overall strategy of
the Internationalist Communist Party [Parti Communiste Internationaliste
(PCI)], which had only been formed a few months earlier from several
organizations. Idem., .
. Ibid., .
. Ibid.
. Liêm-Khê Tran-Nu (Luguern), “Les travailleurs indochinois en France de
 à ,” . On October , in a note to the Ministry of the Colonies,
M. Grimald of the Labor Ministry called for the purge of European and
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